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The 2010 Iowa judicial elections were, as former ArkansasGovernor Mike Huckabee said soon after, of an “historicnature,” likely “one that . . . will give legs to a larger move-
ment over the next few years.”1 The election he referred to, in
which Iowans voted against retention of three justices who had
participated in their Supreme Court’s unanimous decision to
uphold gay marriage, surely is one of the most significant judi-
cial elections ever. It also was the highest-visibility judicial elec-
tion since 1986, when Californians voted down the retention of
Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of her colleagues.2
Even before election day, the 2010 judicial election cycle
was unique: never before had so many states had organized
opposition to a justice up for retention—this  time, six states.3
Although only in Iowa was the opposition intense and ulti-
mately successful, the widespread efforts and the result in Iowa
may well open a new era of heat in judicial elections of all
types—retention-only as well as partisan and nonpartisan.  
Notably, though, in the five states other than Iowa with
opposition to judges in 2010, there was less support for reten-
tion, on average, than had been the case from 1998 to 2008.
Support also declined even in states without organized opposi-
tion to retention.4
Unlike the impact of the 1986 California event, which had
occurred because of Bird’s consistent reversal of scores of cap-
ital cases and had little if any ripple effects, this time several
specific reasons point toward more challenges to incumbent
judges.  Not only are more contests likely, but well-informed
observers fear that judges’ actions on the bench may reflect
increased concern with possible public reactions to decisions.
In the remainder of this article, I will place the Iowa reten-
tion-election contests into context regarding how judges are
selected, focusing on recent changes. I will then review what
happened during the Iowa election itself. With that back-
ground in place, I will offer some personal opinions—first,
regarding the Iowa campaign itself; next, regarding the likely
impact of the Iowa election and its result; and last, regarding
steps that might be taken to reduce the likelihood of more
attacks on judges.
SOME CONTEXT ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Of all state appellate judges and general-jurisdiction trial
judges, 89% face some type of election.5 Facing retention-only
elections are 42% of appellate judges and 19% of general-juris-
diction trial judges; facing nonpartisan elections, 20% of appel-
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Author’s Note:  To a number of Iowans and others, I am immeasurably
indebted for their wisdom, information, and dedication to shared val-
ues in protecting and promoting our constitutional order and the rule
of law.
Footnotes 
* For James Madison’s memorable treatment in the Federalist
Papers of the dangers in the “tyranny of [the people’s] own pas-
sions,” see note 28 infra.
1. Mike Glover, Huckabee Says Ousting of Iowa Judges Historic Move,
Associated Press, Nov. 22, 2010. Huckabee was “in Des Moines
courting evangelical conservatives . . . .” Id. Huckabee was not the
only leading Republican to speak out in support of the electoral
majority shortly after the vote. Newt Gingrich, also campaigning
in Iowa at that time, said that the four justices who had not been
on the ballot should resign. Kathie Obradovich, Gingrich:
Remaining Iowa Justices Should Resign, DES MOINES REGISTER online
commentary, Nov. 16, 2010, available at http://blogs.desmoines
register.com/dmr/index.php/2010/11/16/gingrich-remaining-iowa-
jus tices-should-resign/. Two other Republicans with a national pro-
file also supported the “message being sent” by the Iowa voters—
Congresswoman Michelle Bachman and former Senator Rick
Santorum; both spoke on C-Span, one in a broadcast talk and the
other in an interview. See Amy Gardner, Pairing Religious with
Fiscal Sets Iowa Tea Party Apart, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 3, 2011,
p. A3. 
Meanwhile, the president of the American Bar Association,
Stephen N. Zack, wrote an op-ed for the Des Moines Register urg-
ing that we protect courts from intimidation. Stephen N. Zack,
Warning Bells in Midwest:  Protect Courts from Intimidation, DES
MOINES REGISTER, Nov. 24, 2010. And the president of the New
York City Bar Association, Samuel W. Seymour, said that “[w]hen
a judge suffers an electoral defeat because he or she exercised judi-
cial independence, we all suffer.” Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2010 (available on Westlaw at 2010 WLNR 22229693). A
Washington Post editorial argued that merit-selection systems
“would better shield judges from the most corrosive aspects of
political elections” and that judges “should not be swayed by the
political whims of the day.” Firing Judges, WASHINGTON POST, Nov.
5, 2010, p. A20. 
2. See ABA TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Part 2), 5 (1998) (“ABA TASK FORCE
REPORT”). On that contest’s unprecedented campaign spending,
see Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add:
Nonpartisan Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1406-
07 (2003).
3. See A.G. Sulzberger, Voters Moving to Oust Judges Over Decisions,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, p. A1. The significance of this move-
ment in 2010 is shown by the New York Times’ decision to run an
article about it on the paper’s front page.
In the past, organized opposition to justices in even two states
in one year had occurred only twice. In 1986, organized opposi-
tion succeeded in California (see note 2 supra); also, one Nebraska
justice faced some organized opposition. In 1996, a Nebraska jus-
tice was denied retention; he had authored a unanimous opinion
invalidating a term-limits law and was opposed by a national orga-
nization that spent an estimated $200,000 (no disclosure was
required or given). That same year, Tennessee Supreme Court
Justice Penny White, the first to face a retention election there,
 
late judges and 41% of general-jurisdiction trial judges; and
facing partisan elections for initial terms, 33% of appellate
judges and 38% of general-jurisdiction trial judges.6 Unlike
the system of appointing federal judges, unchanged since
1789, judicial selection in the states is not only varied but also
has been subject to frequent controversy and change since the
early 19th century. The states started with appointment sys-
tems, but in the early 19th century many replaced appoint-
ments with partisan elections; then during several decades
around 1900 many states went to nonpartisan elections; and
from 1940 to the end of the 1980s many turned to “merit” sys-
tems, with screening committees sending nominations to the
appointers and the appointed judges subsequently facing the
voters for retention or rejection.7
For present purposes, we must pay special attention to
developments beginning in the 1970s. Judicial elections, what-
ever the system, for generations were almost always as unex-
citing as “checkers by mail.”8 The first notable change
occurred in 1978 in Los Angeles County:  because of rulings by
some trial judges appointed by then-Governor Jerry Brown,
the deputy district attorneys early in that election year literally
ran an ad in the daily legal newspaper offering to support any-
one who would challenge an unchallenged incumbent judge.
That effort produced elections lively enough that some
changes followed: e.g., judges increased their appearances at
community affairs, issued “state of the court” reports, and
invited jurors to visit chambers after a case.9
Over the next decade in Texas, unprecedented campaign
spending occurred as part of the battle between plaintiffs and
defense lawyers over the
conduct of tort litigation.
After several Texas elec-
tions, the defense side had
won that contest and
spending shrunk to minor
sums there. But similar big-
spending contests occurred
in several other states, peaking in 2000 when the national total
spent by high-court candidates rose 61% over 1998; in addi-
tion, interest groups’ “independent spending” hit at least $16
million that year, far more than ever before.10 Since 2000,
although the total sums spent nationally have fallen, in infla-
tion-adjusted terms, from the peak spending in 2000, more
and more individual states have set new records for judicial
campaign spending.  Obviously, the era of quiet judicial elec-
tions has ended, replaced by contests that were “nastier, nois-
ier, and costlier.”11
But significant additional change started in 2004 in
Missouri, which has been famous since 1940 for being the first
state to adopt a “merit” system.  In 2004, for the first time in
decades, a Missouri justice faced organized opposition to his
retention.  Several groups were active against the justice, using
methods like robocalls with a message from Phyllis Schlafly.12
The justice won but the lesson was rich, though it drew almost
no attention:  while the opposition’s grassroots believed the
contest was all about that justice and/or sending a message to
judges generally, savvy observers believed that the opposition
leaders’ actual aim was to increase total turnout of anti-judge
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lost after attacks on her having joined a decision that overturned
a capital sentence, an attack that was a façade in order to open a
vacancy for a new appointment. After she was denied retention,
the state’s governor was asked, “Should a judge look over his
shoulder [when making decisions] about whether they’re going to
be thrown out of office?”  “I hope so,” he answered. See David B.
Frohnmayer, Who’s to Judge?, 58 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9 (1997). See ABA
TASK FORCE REPORT, note 2 supra, at 6 (1998); on the Tennessee
events, see also Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in
Peril: The Endangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and
Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1240 n.
48 (2008).
As for the five states other than Iowa with organized opposition
in 2010:
Alaska Justice Dana Fabe won retention with 55% of the votes
despite the opposition of the Alaska “political arm of the anti-
abortion, pro-traditional marriage Alaska Family Council,” with
funding mainly from the “national Christian group Focus on the
Family.” Voters Retain Fabe as Alaska Supreme Court Justice,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 3, 2010 (available on Westlaw at
2010 WLNR 21953342).
Three Colorado justices were opposed by Clear the Bench
Colorado “for [partisan] rulings on taxes and fees, congressional
redistricting and eminent domain.”  Felisa Cardona, The Colorado
Vote: Judges Retention: Three on Supreme Court Face Effort to
Remove Them, DENVER POST, Nov. 3, 2010 (available on Westlaw at
2010 WLNR 21986437). The Colorado Attorney General, a
Republican, had spoken against the three to a Republican club, see
Lynn Bartels, AG Regrets Court Remark: A Blog Says Suthers Told a
GOP Club He Won’t Vote for Three State Justices, DENVER POST, Jan.
19, 2010 (available on Westlaw at 2010 WLNR 1152505). They
won with 59%, 60%, and 62%. These percentages and the others
in this footnote are from William Raftery, National Center for State
Courts, NOV. 2 JUDICIAL ELECTIONS ROUNDUP, available at
http://www.ncsc.org/Conferences-and-Events/Nov-2-Judicial-
Elections-Roundup.aspx.
In Florida, Justices Jorge Labarga and James E.C. Perry were
opposed but both won, Labarga by “the lowest approval in state
history although that was still 58.9%” and Perry by 61.7%. “With
little or no funding, several single-issue activist groups influenced
a statewide election that normally attracts little interest—and
that’s troubling to those who believe it marks the beginning of a
movement that could shake the foundation of the judiciary. . . .”
The opposition to the Florida justices “focused on one issue”:
they had joined three other justices in keeping off the ballot a
GOP-backed “measure designed to derail federal health care legis-
lation”; the court had found the ballot language confusing. A 29-
second video posted on YouTube.com, using photos of the jus-
tices, said, “Vote out the Obamacare supporters. They voted
against us. Now we can vote against them.”  The ad was made by
a doctor and the executive director of Florida’s chapter of Ron
Paul’s Campaign for Liberty. Another ad similarly posted, by the
Florida Tenth Amendment Center, urged defeating the two who
had denied voters “the right to vote on health care freedom.”  Jane
Musgrave, Florida Judges May Be on Political Hotseat, PALM BEACH
POST, Nov. 13, 2010, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/
news/state/florida-judges-may-be-on-political-hot-seat-
1045961.html?printArticle=y. 
Judicial elections . . .
for generations
were almost always
as unexciting as
“checkers by mail.”
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people, hoping their votes
would help win several nonju-
dicial races. And in 2006,
again in Missouri, the voters
defeated a trial judge in Cole
County (home of the state
capital, Jefferson City—about
two-thirds of Missouri’s trial
judges face contestable parti-
san elections); the judge had
been challenged because a
campaign consultant deemed
that judge the most vulnera-
ble of several up for reelection; the consultant had found fund-
ing from an out-of-state deep-pocket judge-hater.13
While 2010 campaigns were particularly difficult for incum-
bents generally, not merely judges, for years hostility to courts
has been active and rising.  The 2010 judicial elections took us
to a new stage, described with unusual clarity, depth, and con-
ciseness by South Dakota’s Chief Justice David Gilbertson:  
. . .  I think events have taken an ominous turn for the
worse. For several years expensive and sometimes
nasty judicial elections have gone on. However they
appear to me to be mostly . . . the trial lawyers and
unions vs. the chamber of commerce and insurance
companies. They were wallet driven. Now the issue
has changed to issues concerning personal beliefs and
lifestyles. [T]he recent results in Iowa show a new
anti-judicial force which is . . . able to portray itself as
the defender of values and rights instead of the judi-
ciary.14
WHAT HAPPENED IN IOWA
We turn now to the 2010 Iowa election. For starters, a blog
posting shortly after the election by a Dr. Richard G. Lee pro-
vides a must-read account about the opposition’s start with
seed money from Newt Gingrich, the opposition’s organiza-
tion, and its activities (plus discussion of several alleged mis-
steps by supporters of the justices).15 Several knowledgeable
Iowans, though not all agreed on every alleged fact in that
posting, do agree that it is generally a full and fascinating pic-
ture. 
In April 2009, a unanimous Iowa Supreme Court decision
had struck down Iowa’s 1998 Defense of Marriage Act in a suit
brought in 2005 by six gay couples who had been denied mar-
riage licenses.16 (The trial judge, who also had ruled for the
plaintiffs, won retention in the 2010 election.)  Turnout was
Iowa’s highest in any non-presidential year, and the votes cast
on retention set a record for Iowa and were near the highest in
any state ever. Normally only a bit more than 60% of Iowa vot-
ers would cast a ballot on whether to retain a justice, but 88%
did so in 2010.17 The justices won only 46% for retention.  In
Iowa’s prior 1,322 retention votes, four trial judges had lost
(otherwise, trial judges had won with majorities ranging from
about 55% to about 75%) but no appellate judges had lost;
appellate judges had averaged more than 70% voting for reten-
tion in all but two elections: 2000 and 2006. 
The campaign spending against the justices totaled almost
In Illinois, Justice Thomas Kilbride (who won with 66%) was
involved in the only big-money  retention contest, with about
$2.5 million spent by his supporters (“plaintiffs’ lawyers, unions
and other interests channeling money through the Illinois
Democratic Party, which has an obvious stake in how the . . . court
comes down in future legal battles over redistricting”), and about
$650,000 by his opponents (including “$150,000 from the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, $180,000 from a group closely aligned
with the National Association of Manufacturers and nearly
$90,000 from the American Tort Reform Association”). Editorial,
Judges and Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010 (available on Westlaw
at 2010 WL 21691000). That court has some history of unusually
partisan action in reviewing redistricting, see Jackson Williams,
Irreconcilable Principles: Law, Politics, and the Illinois Supreme
Court, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 267, 290-91 (1998), and People ex. rel.
Burris v. Ryan, 634 N.E.2d 1066, 1067-68 (Ill. 1994) (Harrison, J.,
dissenting) (charging colleague with changing his vote in a redis-
tricting case after deciding to change parties).
Kilbride, who became chief justice after the election, said this:
“If we are going to allow the courts to be politicized to this degree
. . . it’s going to ruin the court system. We might as well shut down
the third branch.”  John Gramlich, Judges’ Battles Signal a New Era
for Retention Elections, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, p. A8 (available
on Westlaw at 2010 WLNR 25819195).
In Kansas, most notable was a full-page ad run in support of the
four justices up for retention: “Kansas Wins With a Fair and
Impartial Judiciary,” naming the justices, with brief text noting
that they had “passed the demanding review of the independent
Kansas Commission on Judicial Performance. See the
Commission’s positive reviews at [the Commission’s website]. Be
informed before you go to the polls.”  The ad opened with, “We
urge you to vote to retain,” with photographs of three supporters
of the justices:  the current governor, a former governor, and for-
mer United States Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum. The ad ran
in the Wichita Eagle and the Topeka Capitol-Journal and is on the
web at http://www.justiceforkansasinc.com/media-room.
Important in evaluating (and for adapting) that Kansas ad is
that brief as was its text, it referred explicitly to the “positive
reviews” about the justices by the official, independent
Commission on Judicial Performance (established in 2006). 
4. The six states with organized opposition saw these declines in the
percentage vote for retention:  Iowa 27%-28%, Illinois 13%,
Colorado 10%-13%, Kansas 6%-7%, Florida 6%-9%, and Alaska
7%. Data on these retention elections are from the new and won-
derfully exhaustive work by Dr. Albert Klumpp (correspondence
with author, February 2011).
5. Data as of 2004 compiled by National Center for State Courts, see
Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95
GEO. L. J. 1077,1104 (2007).
6. Id. 
7. From 1940 to 1967, ballot propositions to move to “merit” won in
seven states; from 1969 through 1977, there were seven more vic-
tories for merit selection and four defeats; since 1978, there have
been six victories and nine defeats, with a two-victory, six-defeat
score for merit selection from 1987 to date. See AMERICAN
JUDICATURE SOCIETY, CHRONOLOGY OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL
MERIT SELECTION BALLOT MEASURES, available at http://www.
judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Merit_selection_
The campaign
spending against
the justices 
totaled almost $1
million, including
more than
$900,000 from
three out-of-state
organizations . . . .
chronology_1C233B5DD2692.pdf.
On the past 105 years’ glacial progress (which if continued will
need another 160 years to end contestable elections for appellate
judges and 770 years for trial judges), see Roy A. Schotland,
Introduction: Personal Views, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1361, 1366-67
(2001) (introducing “Call To Action” and papers from the
National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection). In fact, we
might be moving in the other direction: “Back in 1906, Roscoe
Pound, a scholar at Harvard Law School, started a campaign to
have judges appointed. When he spoke, eight in ten American
judges stood for election. Today, the figure is 87%.” The Election of
Judges: Guilty, Your Honour?, THE ECONOMIST, July 24, 2004, at 28-
29; see also My Judge Is a Party Animal, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 1,
2005, at 20. 
“[The recent] loss of reform momentum has led groups like the
[ABA] to seek ways of improving existing modes of selection
rather than transforming them, at least in the short run.” G. Alan
Tarr, The Judicial Branch, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 85, 99-
100 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (footnotes
omitted). How telling it is that in 1988, Professor Tarr wrote of the
movement toward “merit” systems. G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cordelia
Porter, State Supreme Courts in STATE AND NATION 61 (1990). Many
lawyers and good-government advocates have a strong preference
for “merit” systems, but “the evidence supporting [the claims for
its superiority] is largely anecdotal.” Tarr, The Judicial Branch,
supra.
Efforts to end contestable elections have failed for a generation
(except for one Missouri county in 2008, Green County, the state’s
largest jurisdiction that had not already adopted “merit” and
retention). Not only are such efforts running into reality, they
actually impede judicial reform by distracting from feasible steps
that will reduce the problems in contestable elections, e.g. (a)
steps to inform voters about the candidates and the differences
between judges and other elective officials, and (b) establishing
Campaign Conduct Oversight Committees. See notes 32 and 46
infra.
8. William C. Bayne, Lychard’s Candidacy, Ads, Putting Spice into
Justice Race, COMM. APPEAL (Memphis), Oct. 29, 2000, at p. 1
(available on Westlaw at 2000 WLNR 5193408).
9. And campaigns changed. Later one judge wrote (when the
California Judges Association [CJA] surveyed incumbents about
campaigns):  “Having learned my lesson from the 1978 up-rising,
[this time] I hired a campaign manager immediately . . . . I won
easily (63% to 37%) in spite of a libelous brochure put out by my
opponent the week before the election. . . . It is easy for the
Deputy District Attorneys, who have everything to gain and noth-
ing to lose, to oppose an incumbent judge who has everything to
lose.” The CJA held sessions on campaigning. Political consultant
Joseph Cerrell, who, after 1978, worked in several hundred
California judicial contests, said this:  “Our senators have a polit-
ical operation for use in retaliation. For the most past, judges are
standing naked in the political process not knowing what, when
or how to do anything.”  Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’
Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes
of American Democracy?, 2 J.LAW. & POL’Y 57, 68-69, 71-72 (1985).   
10. Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000:  Change and
Challenge, 3 M.S.U.-D.C.L.L.REV. 849, 850-51 (2001).
$1 million, including more than $900,000 from three out-of-
state organizations:  the National Organization for Marriage
based in Washington, D.C.; the American Family Association’s
AFA Action, Inc. of Tupelo, Mississippi; and the Campaign for
Working Families PAC of Arlington, Virginia. The main in-
state sum spent against the justices was $10,178, by the Iowa
Family Policy Center ACTION. 18
A similar retention contest occurred in Nebraska in 1996,
when out-of-state funds flooded in to defeat one justice who
had written the opinion in a unanimous decision striking
down Nebraska’s term-limits statute.19
Opposition to the justices was led by Bob Vander Plaats,
who had lost two Republican gubernatorial primaries and one
for lieutenant governor.  After losing in a 2010 primary, he put
his full-time effort into the anti-retention campaign.  Although
the opposition funding was almost all from outside Iowa,
unquestionably there was a great deal of active local support;
for example, one of Iowa’s congressmen led a bus tour around
the state.20 One other important aspect of the Iowa opposition
was that “more than 200 churches” actively participated in the
opposition.21
For the justices, $423,767 raised entirely in Iowa was spent
by the Iowa-based Fair Courts for Us Committee.22 That was
one of three groups supporting retention, but “Justice Not
Politics” and “Iowans for Fair Courts” did not spend on direct
advocacy but only on educational efforts.  The group called
Justice Not Politics also spent about $8,000 on such efforts.
The one radio spot supporting the justices is worth noting:
“[Background noise of sports official’s whistling and
stadium crowd stirring:]
“[Voice 1:] And the
flags are flying! Looks
like a questionable call.
I think we are going to
see some fans calling for
these referees’ jobs.
“[Voice 2:] Listen,
we will never agree to every call, but you should not
fire the good referees on just one call. The same is
true of the Iowa Supreme Court. I am Bob Ray,
Republican and former Iowa Governor. The Iowa
Supreme Court has been making solid judgments over
the years. The Court protected Iowa families by
requiring convicted sex offenders to live at least 2,000
ft. away from a school or child care center; protected
Iowa seniors and protected our individual property
rights. Please join me, Bob Ray, in turning over the
ballot and voting yes, yes, yes, to retain the Iowa
Supreme Court. There’s enough politics out there and
we don’t need it in our courts.
“Paid for by Fair Courts for Us.”23
Views of that ad’s effectiveness were divided both before it
ran and after, some people feeling that it branded or came too
close to branding the Varnum decision a “bad call.” 24 The ad
was aired enough to consume most of the funds supporting the
justices.  
From outside Iowa, the justices got no help except for a visit
Views of that ad’s
effectiveness were
divided both
before it ran and
after . . . .
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11. Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150
(1988).
12. See Margaret Ebrahim, The Bible Bench, MOTHER JONES, May-June
2006, at 54-57, 81-83. “Many on the religious right felt that the
third branch of government should be as accountable to the pub-
lic as the legislative branch was. . . . ‘There’s nothing the matter
with [judgeships] being political,’ Schlafly told the Kansas City
Star.” Id. at 57.
13. The political consultant said, at a gathering of lawyers and busi-
ness leaders in Kansas City shortly after the election, that “some
of these [anti-judiciary] groups just want a scalp to hang on the
wall.”  Scott Lauck, Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan May Be Best
for Cole County, MISSOURI LAWYERS WEEKLY, Nov. 20, 2006 (avail-
able on LexisNexis). See also John DeMoor, Debate Reveals Rock
’Em, Sock ’Em Future of Judicial Politics, MISSOURI LAWYERS WEEKLY,
May 28, 2007 (available on Westlaw at 2007 WLNR 26581789).
The source of funding was a New York real estate figure chairing
Americans for Limited Government, which also supported
Colorado and Montana ballot propositions to limit judges. See
Lauck, supra; Tim Hoover, National Dollars Find, Defeat Circuit
Judge, KANSAS CITY STAR, Dec. 4, 2006, at p. A1 (available on
Westlaw at 2006 WLNR 20875926). 
One observer believes that the consultant hoped to scare judges
into hiring political consultants to stave off such attacks in the
future. Other observers believe that the challenge was supported
by major figures in the political branches who were displeased
with recent court decisions and wanted to send a message to the
judiciary.
14. Email to author, November 17, 2010.
15. See Richard G. Lee, Behind the Fall of Iowa’s Judicial Gods, online
posting at “Dallas Blog,” available at http://www.dallasblog.com/
201011231007382/guest-viewpoint/behind-the-fall-of-iowa-s-
judicial-gods.html.
The Los Angeles Times has reported that Gingrich “[l]ast fall 
. . . played a key behind-the-scenes role in an unprecedented—and
successful—campaign to remove three Iowa Supreme Court
judges  . . . helping secure $200,000 in seed money for the effort.
. . . ‘It wouldn’t have happened without Newt,’ said David Lane,
executive director of Iowa for Freedom, the organization that led
the campaign. ‘Newt provided strategic advice and arranged the
initial seed money . . . which is what got everything started.’  The
money came from an anonymous donor whose contribution was
arranged by Gingrich, Lane said. Robert L. Vander Plaats, chief
spokesman for the judicial campaign, said the former speaker pro-
vided key strategic advice.” Tom Hamburger & Matea Gold,
Gingrich Courts the Religious Right, L.A. TIMES, p. 1 (available on
Westlaw at 2011 WLNR 4124524).
That report was followed by two others which said the sum was
$150,000. Tom Witosky, Gingrich Group Gave to Effort Against
Justices, DES MOINES REGISTER, March 16, 2011, at p. A1 (available
on Westlaw at 2011 WLNR 5152390); and AP, Gingrich Funnels
$150K to Iowa Groups That Defeated Justices by Way of Aide’s
Committee, WASH. POST, March 15, 2011. 
16. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). The decision drew
national attention at once, see e.g., Teddy Davis & Ferdous Al-
Faruque, Iowa: The Gay Marriage Mecca?, ABC NEWS, April 3,
2009, available at http.//abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=
7253244&page=1.
and talk by former United
States Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor. In
September, she addressed
“more than 200 elected offi-
cials and guests of the Iowa
Bar Association . . . .”  Praising
Iowa’s judicial-selection sys-
tem, she also made this pow-
erful statement:
Justice [David]
Souter and I both look
at the Court as the one
safe place where a person can have a fair and impartial
hearing . . . and we have to keep that.  [We] have to
address the pressures being applied to that one safe
place . . . to have it where judges are not subject to out-
right retaliation.25
It’s not clear, though, that Justice O’Connor’s effort had any
lasting impact.
Strikingly absent or severely limited were efforts by national
organizations with the mission of supporting judicial indepen-
dence. Four are relevant, the largest by far being the American
Bar Association, but the ABA understandably leaves local
action to state and local bar associations.  And what any state
or local bar will do depends on who happens to be the leader-
ship at the time and whether anyone can be recruited who has
time available and the relevant experience.  The Iowa Bar was
alert to the situation, did come into action, and their action
was substantial, but not more; it aimed entirely at explaining
voting in a retention election. 
Three other national organizations focus fully or largely on
judicial selection systems. Newest is the Colorado-based
Institute to Advance the American Legal System, started in
2006 and working with Justice O’Connor.  In 2010, it gave its
attention to a Nevada ballot proposition to replace their con-
testable election system with a “merit” appointment and reten-
tion system.  Nevada twice before had defeated similar propos-
als, and 2010 saw it defeated a third time, this time with 58%
voting against the proposal.26
The oldest of these three national organizations, the
American Judicature Society, founded in 1913 and by coinci-
dence based in Iowa, is legally barred (as a 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt entity) from election activity, but its regular education
programs included efforts and events in Iowa; how much, if at
all, those programs affected the election seems impossible to
say. Last, the most active of these entities, networked and well
funded (mainly by George Soros’s Open Society Institute), is
Justice at Stake, which has “partnered” with an array of other
organizations such as the ABA, the National Center for State
Courts, the League of Women Voters, the American Judges
Association, and many reform groups. Like the American
Judicature Society, Justice at Stake is barred from election
activity; its president wrote an op-ed about voting in retention
elections, published online in the Denver Post.27
Would the justices and judicial independence have been
aided if more visitors like Justice O’Connor had come to Iowa,
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For a thorough and learned analysis of the decision, see Todd
Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three
Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2011); see also
Chase D. Anderson, A Quest for Fair and Balanced: The Supreme
Court, State Courts, and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage Review
after Perry, 60 DUKE L.J. 1413, 1431-39 (Of the four states’
supreme court cases, “Only the Iowa court had a developed evi-
dentiary record on which to base its conclusions. . . . The Iowa
court’s opinion contained the strongest reasoning.”). 
17. The extremely high participation in voting on retention was
attributable in part to the fact that the races for Governor and for
U.S. Senator were not at all close, so attention in media coverage
and otherwise focused on the retention contest.
18. All spending data are from the NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN
STATE POLITICS, INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN IOWA TOPPLE THREE
HIGH COURT JUSTICES, Jan. 10, 2011, available at http://www.fol-
lowthemoney.org/press/ReportView.
19. See note 3 supra.
20. See Lynda Waddington, Anti-Judge Bus Tour Dwarfed by Pro-
Retention Rally, THE IOWA INDEP., Oct. 28, 2010, available at
http://iowaindependent.com/46337/anti-judge-bus-tour-dwarfed-
by-pro-retention-rally.
21. See Pettys, note 16 supra, at 74. One pastor “has a prayer that he
recites as he campaigns . . ., ‘Dear God, he says, ‘please allow the
IRS to attack my church, so I can take them all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court.’”  Bryan Ray, Iowa Pastor Preaches Politics to Oust
3 Justices Who Backed Gay Marriage, USA TODAY, October 13,
2010. A “Project Jeremiah 2010” pledged free legal support to the
churches, see Jason Hancock, Second Iowa Pastor Takes Aim at
Judges, THE IOWA INDEP., Oct. 7, 2010, available at http://iowa
independent.com/44775/second-iowa-pastor-takes-aim-at-judges. 
22. After the National Institute report (see note 18 supra) on the Iowa
spending, a late contribution raised the Fair Courts’ total by
$6,500. See email to author from Linda Casey of National
Institute, Feb. 15, 2011. 
Almost no funds were raised before mid-October.  The State Bar
contributed $50,000 (10/18); Iowa Academy of Trial Lawyers
$50,000 (mostly 10/20); Polk County Bar Assoc. $13,124 (10/29);
American Bd. of Trial Advocates $5,000 (10/18); Iowa Defense
Counsel Assoc. $5,000 (10/27); AFSCME $25,000 (10/18);
Human Rights Campaign Equality Votes $25,000 (10/25);
Fairness Fund $25,000 (10/13); Midwest Capital Group Inc.
$20,000 (10/18); also, one individual contributed $50,000
(10/12). Information provided author by Fair Courts for Us
Committee; and see Fair Courts’ filings on Independent
Expenditure by an Organization, Iowa Ethics and Campaign
Disclosure Board.
Iowa’s campaign finance disclosure, administered by the Ethics
and Campaign Finance Board, seems a case study in how to frus-
trate any use of such information. For example, the “Independent
Expenditure” reports filed by the Fair Courts committee have
cover pages with total sums that differ substantially from the
accompanying detailed pages; the columns of donors’ names are
mostly unmatchable with the columns of contribution amounts;
many donors are listed without contribution amounts, etc.   
23. Transcribed for this article.
24. The ad was produced hastily because funds became available only
very shortly before the election. In my view, the ad would have
such as former chief justices from other states who might have
drawn upon experience from judicial elections in various
selection systems? Such speakers might produce press cover-
age and meet with many groups in many locations—should
that be tried in a coming election? Experienced observers in
several states say that judges cannot be effective supporters of
other judges; voters are likely to view the effort as self-protec-
tion.  The most effective supporters are likely to be respected
former high officials or other persons who enjoy strong public
regard, like some media stars and the voters’ local members of
the state legislature.  (But former chief justices or justices with
campaign experience might be invaluable sounding boards for
candidates in contests.)
Many state bar associations and others do have “rapid
response” plans and people ready to defend courts when
judges are under inappropriate attack. Looking backward,
ought responses to have been launched in Iowa shortly after
the Varnum decision came under attack?  More to the point,
ought the next similar situation draw more early-response
attention than this one did?
Two post-election gatherings in Iowa have looked back on
the election usefully.  In December, two focus groups met to
discuss the election.  According to one observer’s report:
We heard a lot of “It may have been the ‘right’ deci-
sion based on the Constitution, but I just don’t like it.
So I voted them out.” Repeatedly we saw voters unable
to understand the differences between what judges do
and what non-judicial elective officials do. This basic
civics gap as it relates to the difference between the
three branches of govern-
ment . . . was cavernous. 
Another observer said this: 
[What] may be most
important for us going for-
ward—several expressed a
frustration with the fact
that they didn’t know who
the justices were, how
they became justices, how
they arrived at their deci-
sion, what gave them the right to make the decision,
etc. There appears to be a great desire for more infor-
mation and more education. . . . 
A third observer said that one focus group participant com-
mented along these lines:           
Much as I oppose the court’s decision, I know so lit-
tle about judges that I shouldn’t be allowed to vote on
them.
And in February, at a University of Iowa Law School panel
discussion about the election, Justice Michael Streit, one of the
three denied retention, said that “politicians demanded judges
follow the popular vote, instead of ruling on the law. . . .  They
kept saying it was the ‘will of the people’ but who are these
people?”28 Very differently, Vanderbilt Law School Professor
Brian Fitzpatrick said that “the only question is whose politics
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“We heard a lot
of ‘It may have
been the “right”
decision based on
the Constitution,
but I just don’t
like it. So I voted
them out.’”
been beyond criticism if only one sentence were changed, replac-
ing  “you should not fire the good referees on just one call,” with
something like this: “We all know that some calls look bad to
some people and look good to other people, but we know we need
referees who are neutral; we can’t rely on any other kind.”
25. Tyler Kingkade, Sandra Day O’Connor Visits, Admires Iowa Court
System, IOWA STATE DAILY, Sept. 8, 2010, available at
http://www.iowastatedaily.com/news/article_1a95721e-bb9b-
11df-9116-001cc4c03286.html; and see Dahlia Lithwick, Cheap
Seats: How Sandra Day O’Connor Got Drawn into the Gay-Marriage
Debate in Iowa, SLATE, Nov. 13, 2010, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2267160. 
26. Valerie Miller, Ballot Measures Die on Election Day, LAW VEGAS
BUSINESS PRESS, Nov. 15, 2010. The State Bar president, who had
supported the measure, said, “A lot of work went into this. But
this was such a negative election. Voters said ‘no’ to everything.”
The final result did show support had continued rising: a July poll
found 27%, an October poll found 37%. Doug McMurdo, Question
1, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Oct. 30, 2010. 
Nevada voters had rejected the change in 1972 and 1988. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC’Y, Chronology, note 7 supra. In fact, Nevada’s final
result in 2010 showed more support for changing the selection
system than the last generation had won in other states. Such
changes have been consistently defeated for the last generation.
South Dakota voters in 2004 defeated, two to one, a proposal
to have their trial judges selected in the same “merit”/retention
system as their appellate judges, instead of continuing to run in
contestable nonpartisan elections. (However, since 1982 only 21
of 109 judgeships had been contested.) The trial judges them-
selves had earlier been sharply divided about their selection sys-
tem, but for 2004 were unanimous in favoring the change, and the
legislature was only one vote from unanimity in putting the pro-
posal on the ballot. The opposition was summed up by one city
official:  “This proposal is against Motherhood and Apple Pie, it’s
un-American.” Despite an active campaign supporting the
change, it lost after being opposed in a major speech by James
Dobson, whom the New York Times called “the nation’s most influ-
ential evangelical leader.”  Russell Shorto, What’s Their Real
Problem with Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, 34, 41
Jun. 19, 2005. Dobson was in South Dakota campaigning against
Senator Daschle. A few years earlier, Dobson had discovered at an
Alabama rally for their Chief Justice Roy Moore (active advocate
of the Ten Commandments), what Dobson called “the depth of
popular resentment of liberal court decisions.”  As several sup-
porters of the change said after losing, “the people won’t give up
their vote.”
As in South Dakota, Florida’s appellate judges are in a
“merit”/retention system and here too the trial judges face con-
testable (but rarely contested) nonpartisan elections. In 2000,
Floridians (yes, Virginia, there were other races on the Florida bal-
lot that year), defeated a proposal to put their trial judges in the
same system as their appellate judges. The change was defeated in
every circuit with the affirmative vote averaging 32%, and in every
county with the affirmative averaging 26% (the most favorable
was 39%). The change had been supported by the Florida Bar,
which like the ABA and most state bar associations had been urg-
ing such a system for decades.
are driving the judiciary.
Judges make law and law is
what judges say it is. The
Constitution isn’t clear.
Doctrines are invented by
judges and those aren’t
clear. They reach rulings
based on their opinions. It’s
inevitable.”  The election
was summed up by pan-
elist Kathie Obradovich,
political columnist for the
Des Moines Register:  “[T]he campaign on one side was about
education of merit selection process and about the courts, and
the other side was politics. The politics won. But the conver-
sation needs to keep going forward. . . .”29
SOME OPINIONS BASED ON THE 2010 IOWA
ELECTION
THE ELECTION ITSELF
Let’s begin with some thoughts directly about the Iowa elec-
tion itself.
First, should the justices have campaigned?  They did not,
and most knowledgeable observers have faulted them for this.
But I do not, for two reasons: Implying absolutely no view of
these justices, I stress (as I wrote several years ago) that many
fine judges are not political in any sense—no surprise—and
many of them do not fit comfortably into a political role.30
Study of the “judicial personality” shows, as one would expect,
how different it is from the “political personality.”31 Also, cam-
paigning may have undermined, at least somewhat, the funda-
mental position at stake: that the judges’ job is different from
the jobs of other elected officials.32
Second (and entirely separate) is the question whether it is
appropriate to vote against a retention candidate because of
one decision.  The raison d’etre of retention elections is to
reduce politics in judicial selection or retention.  Whatever the
system of selecting and/or retaining judges, they are account-
able for their neutrality and professionalism; if they are to carry
out the rule of law, they are not to be removed from office for
a decision that is unpopular but, in their view, is called for by
the facts and law as they understand it. 
Never is there more potential for judicial account-
ability being distorted and judicial independence being
jeopardized than when a judge is campaigned against
because of a stand on a single issue or even in a single
case.33
Of course, voters, if empowered to vote on judges either in
contestable elections or on retention, obviously can vote on
whatever grounds they wish.  But power doesn’t equal right-
ness.  Judicial elections, whatever the type, are fundamentally
different from other elections because the judge’s job is so dif-
ferent from nonjudicial elective officials.  The differences are
clear first from the array of state constitutional provisions
about judges—e.g., all elective states give judges terms that are
stunningly longer than any other elected officials’ terms.34 But
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And in 1987 in Ohio, a ballot proposition for change lost two
to one and in 80 of Ohio’s 88 counties, despite more than
$400,000 spent to support it by the State Bar and League of
Women Voters. The opposition included the Democratic and
Republican parties and was funded with over $300,000 from the
Ohio AFL/CIO, who ran TV ads that have been the basic theme in
all these contests over change:  “Don’t let them take away your
vote.”   John D. Felice & John C. Kilwein, Strike One, Strike
Two…. The History of and Prospect for Judicial Reform in Ohio,
JUDICATURE, Dec.-Jan. 1992, at 193.                                               
27. Bert Brandenberg, Look at Whole Record of Judges Before Voting,
DENVER POST, posted Oct. 27, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/
guestcommentary/ci_16439027
28. Justice Streit’s “who are these people[?]”goes right to the differ-
ence between election voting on one hand, law on the other. Our
constitutional republic is founded on and functions through three
branches and a specified process of enactment and enforcement of
laws. If the prescribed deliberative, representative, and account-
able process is not followed, we risk replacing law with some peo-
ple’s passions—perhaps widely shared and perhaps not, perhaps
long-lasting and perhaps not.
One of the Federalist Papers’ most memorable statements
addresses precisely this difference: 
As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought,
in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments,
ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are par-
ticular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated
by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled
by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for
measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most
ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how
salutary will be the interference of some temperate and
respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided
career and to suspend the blow meditated by the people
against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain
their authority over the public mind?  What bitter anguish
would not the people of Athens have often escaped if their
government had contained so provident a safeguard against
the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then
have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same
citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next. No.
63 (Madison), ABA Classics Series (2009), at 362-63.
29. Trish Mehaffey, Retention Election Came Down to Politics vs. Law,
EASTERN IOWA NEWS NOW, posted Feb. 3, 2011, http://eastern-
iowanewsnow.com/2011/02/03/retention-election-came-down-to-
politics-vs-law/.
30. However, since the justices were within five percentage points of
being retained, even modest campaigning might well have
changed the result.
Justice Streit (see n. 28 above) said this in February: “ . . . I
think that judges, if they face real opposition, cannot sit back qui-
etly and wait for voters to do what is right. I think they’re going
to have to campaign, and that means . . . to raise money. They’re
going to have to tell people, I will be fair and impartial, but 
please, I need $100,000.”  See DES MOINES REGISTER Staff Blogs,
Ousted Justice: Judges Likely to Need Election Campaigns,
http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2011/02/03/
ousted-justice-judges-likely-to-need-election-campaigns/.
retention elections are not only different, they are unique.35 To
say that it is appropriate for voters in retention elections to toss
out a judge because of a decision, defies the history of the
retention system’s adoption and its design to avoid the advo-
cacy, heat, and range of choice that can come with competing
candidates.36
Let me be explicit that despite my deep disagreement with
those who opposed the Iowa justices’ retention, I respect their
honesty.  They disagreed with one decision that that court had
made, their disagreement was the undeniably clear basis of
their opposition, and they took advantage of an opportunity to
make the justices account for what they had done.  
One cannot deny that voters can use their opportunity to
vote any way they wish.  Nor do I fault advocates and
activists who say that even for judges, elections are a proper
method of accountability.  But it is entirely different for aca-
demics or other supposedly detached observers to endorse
that view.  To ignore the differences between what judges do
and what nonjudicial elective officials do is unthinking or
hyper-simplistic.
Nonjudicial elective officials thrive or lose by their reading
of the support they can secure by adopting positions and
promising to promote them, then by how well they perform in
implementing the promises.  For any judge—even United
States Supreme Court justices—“hot-button” issues are rare
(even at the Supreme Court, only a minute fraction of their
decisions). For most trial judges, such issues are non-existent.
But decades of experience show that when there is organized
opposition to a judge, it is rarely honest. Last year, for example,
Court Review - Volume 46 125
Illinois Supreme Court Justice
Thomas L. Kilbride was
opposed by pro-business inter-
ests unhappy with his voting to
overturn a statute capping med-
ical malpractice damages; but
the opposition’s TV ads focused
on his record in criminal cases
to portray him as “soft on
crime.”37 Similarly, a recent
West Virginia case ended in the
United States Supreme Court
because of the extraordinarily
large independent spending against an incumbent by the presi-
dent of a company with major litigation coming before that
court; that opposition had focused entirely on the incumbent’s
role in a case about a child-abuser.38 In cases like those, it may
well be that most voters in fact agreed with the  decisions that
actually led to the incumbent’s  being opposed, but were misled
by sophisticated campaigning that relied on selling what was
easy to sell.  One of our wisest judges summarized the reality of
judicial elections:  
Every judge’s campaign slogan, in advertisements
and on billboards, is some variation of “tough on
crime.” The liberal candidate is the one who advertises:
“Tough but fair.”  Television campaigns have featured
judges in their robes slamming shut a prison cell door.39
To oppose a judge because of her or his decisions and then
Let me be 
explicit that
despite my deep
disagreement
with those who
opposed the Iowa
justices’ retention,
I respect their
honesty.
The new justices appointed in 2011 to fill the three vacancies
will campaign in 2012.  Jens Manuel Krogstad, New Justices Will
Campaign When Facing Retention Vote, DES MOINES REGISTER, Mar.
24, 2011.  “The justices said that they prefer not to campaign . . .
but that they learned a lesson from last fall’s successful campaign
that ousted three justices. . . .  [Justice] Waterman said he didn’t
like seeing the retention vote and selection process become politi-
cized with outside money.  However, he said the events provided
a good springboard to discuss the importance of the judiciary.”
31. For the 1998 study by the presiding judge of the San Bernardino
trial courts, see my Six Fatal Flaws, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 233, 242-
45 (2008) (“Elective Campaigns and the Judicial Pool”).
32. For a powerful example of voter-aimed material that “It’s
Simple–Judicial Elections are Different,” see the Maryland Judicial
Campaign Conduct Committee’s brochure, available at
http://www.mdjccc.org/index/html.  
Consider how different is the judge’s job:
[O]ther elected officials are open to meeting—at any time
and openly or privately—their constituents or anyone who
may be affected by their action in pending or future matters,
but judges are not similarly open; nonjudicial candidates [are
free to] seek support by making promises about how they
will perform; [o]ther elected officials are advocates, free to
cultivate and reward support by working with their support-
ers to advance shared goals; other elected officials pledge to
change law, and if elected they often work unreservedly
toward change; other elected officials participate in diverse
and usually large multi-member bodies; other elected incum-
bents build up support through “constituent casework,”
patronage, securing benefits for communities, etc.; almost all
other elected officials face challenges in every election; [and
last, fundraising by judicial candidates is uniquely con-
strained]. Robert M. O’Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent
First Amendment Rulings, 34 IND. L. REV. 701, 716-17 (2002). 
Reflecting such differences, “The judicial role is most likely
more constrained by normative expectations than any other in
American politics.”  James Gibson, in the latest of his important
studies on the effect of judicial campaigns on the legitimacy of
courts, Judges, Elections, and the American Mass Public (forthcom-
ing), at 8.
33. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, see note 2 supra, at 6.
34. Conference of Chief Justices, amicus brief  in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. Kelly, 122 S.Ct. 643, at 6 (2002). 
35. Indeed, a strong argument has been made that a requirement of
“elections” is not satisfied unless there can be competing candi-
dates. Brian Fitzpatrick, Election as Appointment: The Tennessee
Plan Reconsidered, 75 TENN. L. REV. 473 (2008).
36. Judge Duane Benton of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, who
speaks with the special authority of having been on Missouri’s
high court, described retention elections this way:  
“The strongest advocates of retention elections intended
that they would be nearly meaningless. [He then quoted a
1980 article that retention elections] were designed to allow
qualified judges to serve long terms with only a modest
amount of direct accountability. Indeed, those who devel-
oped the concept preferred life tenure, but they acquiesced
to political realities and allowed the public an opportunity to
remove judges in extreme circumstances. Clearly removal
campaign with attacks based on
unrelated and seriously mis-
leading claims, dishonors the
election process and distorts
accountability.  
A third and last opinion is
about whether the supporters
of the justices should have
relied on defending “fair and
impartial courts” or should
have also defended the decision
on gay marriage.  Organizations as well as individuals have
strong and conflicting views about what message should be
used.  My own view is that both messages should be pressed
(probably by different groups or advocates) because the mes-
sages will draw different supporters.  As the late Henry Hyde,
a long-time Congressman from Illinois, once said, “Politics is a
game of addition.  You start with your followers and bring in
new ones, constantly broadening the circle . . . .”40
WHAT OF IT? THE IMPACT OF THE ELECTION  
One distinguished  professor of constitutional law has sug-
gested that this Iowa experience may have no lasting negative
impact on the rule of law: 
What happened in Iowa cannot help but give a tem-
porary chill to other courts when faced with such a
highly charged political issue as gay marriage. . . .  But
this sort of thing happens episodically, creates a stir and
then dies down.   Some accountability is not a bad idea.
The rule of law is not in danger because of this one
election. 41
That is an optimistic view, but with all respect, it is mis-
leadingly superficial.  First, it fails to note that the Iowa event
has several different impacts: one, as noted, is a likely chilling
effect on future decisions in many sates; another is the proba-
bility, as I note below, of a significant increase in challenges to
judges in many states and in all kinds of elections; and last is
this:  At least until the Iowa event’s impacts do “die down,” we
will suffer from some indeterminate number of fine lawyers
who would make fine judges, and fine judges who are coming
up for reelection or retention, who decide against being on the
bench because of the job’s newly increased insecurity.   Second,
while of course “[t]he rule of law is not in danger because of
this one election,” neither did one presidential assassination
put American politics in danger.  But even if some disasters die
down after brief stirs, several reasons suggest that the Iowa
event is likely to have lasting impact.  One cannot predict just
how much, but it will be enough to matter, enough to cause
substantial concern.42
Because: 
1. Judicial elections (until a few in recent years) were always
either completely quiet or, even if lively, had no impact on
other elections.  Starting with Missouri’s 2004 challenge to
a justice’s retention, where much of the motivation was to
increase turnout in nonjudicial elections, the tail has
begun to wag the dog.  That is, judicial elections become
lively because they can be used as a tool to affect nonjudi-
126 Court Review - Volume 46 
[T]he Iowa event
has several 
different impacts:
one . . . is a likely
chilling effect on
future decisions in
many states . . . .
was perceived as the exception, not the rule.’” Benton,
Comments on the White, Caufield & Tarr Articles, 74 MO. L.
REV. 667, 669 (2009).
37. “Kilbride was portrayed as soft on crime in visceral radio ads that
featured actors portraying rapists and murderers. . . . [T]he
acknowledged aim of the Illinois Civic Justice League was to
dump a judge it sees as unwilling to stop large jury awards given
to plaintiffs in malpractice and other negligence lawsuits.”
Monique Garcia, State Supreme Court Justice Wins Retention Battle,
CHI. TRIB.,Nov. 2, 2010.
38. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009).
39. Hans A. Linde, Comment, Elective Judges: Some Comparative
Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, 2000 (1988). For examples of
judicial candidates’ “tough on crime” ads, see Task Force on
Selecting State Ct. Judges, Citizens for Indep. Cts., Choosing
Justice: Reforming the Selection of State Judges, in UNCERTAIN
JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA’S COURTS 77, 101-02 (2000).
40. Peggy Noonan, Where the Leaders Are, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Feb. 18,
2011.
41. Mark Curriden, Judging the Judges, 97 ABA. J. 56, 58 (2011) (quot-
ing NYU professor Barry Friedman). 
The facile “Some accountability is not a bad idea” is foolish.
“Accountability” on a lightning-rod issue arises only if the judge
voted against the preference of people able to organize and secure
funding. This turns justice into gambling with one side holding a
marked deck. Consider, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (upholding a public school pupil’s
right to refuse, on religious grounds, to salute the flag and over-
ruling a contrary 1940 decision); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (upholding a right to counsel in felony trials and over-
ruling a contrary 1942 decision).
42. Whether popular reactions against a few highly visible decisions
will remain episodic, or instead will fuel long-standing efforts to
politicize judicial elections, I cannot predict. Examples of such
efforts in recent years:  Colorado voters rejected an effort to
impose term limits on judges. And in Kansas, local voters rejected
efforts to return to contestable elections by replacing
“merit”/retention systems, and the legislature has rejected efforts
to change the statewide “merit”/retention system for appellate
judges. 
As of March 8, 2011, “legislation has been introduced in at least
eight states to radically restructure or eliminate long-standing
merit selection systems.”  Interestingly, in Iowa “a host” of bills
ended in committee, “thanks in part to the vocal opposition of a
broadly-based bipartisan coalition of legal and non-legal organiza-
tions.”  American Judicature Society press release, Mar. 8, 2011.
43. This does not mean that people like Vander Plaats are taking over
the state party. In fact, Governor Branstad’s appointments to fill
the three vacancies created by the election are traditional for Iowa:
two experienced judges and one notable practitioner, all with rep-
utations for ability and neutrality. See Jerry Krogstad, Branstad’s
Supreme Court Choices, DES MOINES REGISTER, Feb. 23, 2011.
44. For a full-page profile of Vander Plaats, see Kerry Howley, The
Pizza and the Power, NYTIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 3, 2011. He is now
a full-time executive of the FAMiLY LEADER (“they’ve consigned
the ‘I’ to lowercase to emphasize the individual’s submission
before God,” id.), “a social conservative advocacy group started
this week in Iowa,” which is sponsoring presidential candidate
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cial races.  That seems bound to recur.  
2. A second incentive to challenge judges emerged in
Missouri’s 2006 challenge to a trial judge:  the combina-
tion of a consultant eager for a client, with even a single
deep-pocket individual ready to crusade against judges.
Some combination of a consultant and a deep pocket
seems bound to recur.  
3. Iowa brings a new incentive:  any politician who is either
anti-judiciary, or willing to be, can secure enough support
that if the effort wins or almost wins, she or he gains.
Vander Plaats’ having led the Iowa effort to such success
has made him a major figure, probably the state’s number
three Republican after Governor Terry E. Branstad and
Senator Chuck Grassley.43 There are bound to be copyists,
even if Vander Plaats fails in his current effort to sell a
book about Iowa’s 2010 event.44
WHAT TO DO? STEPS TO TAKE TO REDUCE THE
LIKELIHOOD OF MORE ATTACKS ON JUDGES 
What to do? Here, I merely list a few key possibilities
worth consideration:
Outreach, which should be year-in, year-out and should
include “audience multipliers” like Access TV, local radio, and
local newspaper coverage.45
Bench/Bar/Media meetings at least annually, as well as
columns in local newspapers by chief justices and/or other jus-
tices.
Campaign Conduct Committees—unofficial and with mem-
bers who are representative, diverse, and distinguished.46
Readiness of the Bar and
other supporters of fair and
impartial courts, especially
including the general coun-
sels of key organizations and
corporations.
One notable observer of
the Iowa events said that part
of the reason it happened was
that it was so hard to know
the opposition was so substantial.  When I mentioned that to
a state chief justice who is unusually savvy about politics, he
was dismissive, saying that to wait until one knows is to lose,
and that the only sound course is to be ready, working con-
stantly to help the public understand the role of the courts and
how different is the judges’ job from the jobs of other elected
officials.
The impacts of an event like the Iowa voters’ rejection of
their justices are of three types, all severely harmful.  I do not
prioritize among these, but: 
1. Judges everywhere (not only in elective states, but any
judge who is not nearing the end of her or his career) will
be unable to avoid thinking about possible popular reac-
tions, if they have before them a high-visibility case or
issue.47
2. Sitting judges, as well as lawyers willing to serve on the
bench and who would be fine judges, will be more likely
to stop or avoid such service because of the unpredictable
insecurity that is too likely to flow from their doing their
The impacts of an
event like the Iowa
voters’ rejection of
their justices are of
three types, all
severely harmful.
forums in the coming months in which “several prospective can-
didates have agreed . . . to participate . . . .”  Jeff Zeleny,
Conservative Gathering to Test G.O.P. Hopefuls, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2011.
45. The Florida Bar has outstanding materials (and training materials)
for lawyers’ and judges’ outreach presentations, see the
Benchmarks Program of the Judicial Independence Committee of
the Florida Bar, http://www.floridabar.org/judicialindependence.
The ABA also has excellent materials available, see ABA Standing
Committee on Judicial Independence’s Resource Kit on Fair and
Impartial Courts, available at: http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/justice_center/judicial_independence/resources/resource_
kit_on_fair_impartial_courts_lub.html. 
For a remarkable picture of the number and types of outreach
programs, see the more than 50-page annual COMMUNITY
OUTREACH PROGRAMS AND CONTACTS: SUPERIOR COURTS, published
by California’s Administrative Office of the Courts.
Surely illuminating is the fact that the Iowa court has just
begun its first-ever outreach efforts. See William Petroski, State’s
Justices to Take to the Radio Airwaves, DES MOINES REGISTER, Mar.
15, 2011; and see Krogstad, n. 30 supra (“[T]he justices will for
the first time travel around the state to hear arguments.”).
46. See David Rottman, Conduct and its Oversight in Judicial Elections:
Can Friendly Persuasion Outperform the Power to Regulate?, 21
GEO. J. LEG. ETH. 1295 (2008); and see the National Center for
State Courts’ website on such committees, http://www.judicial
campaignoversight.org.
47. “You cannot forget the fact that you have a crocodile in your bath-
tub,” said former California Justice Otto Kaus, referring to con-
troversial cases at election time. “You keep wondering whether
you’re letting yourself be influenced, and you do not know. You do
not know yourself that well.”  D. Morain, Kaus to Retire from State
Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1985. “Should a judge look over
his shoulder [when making decisions] about whether they’re
going to be thrown out of office?  I hope so,” asserted Tennessee’s
Governor after helping to deny retention to Justice Penny White
in 1996. That quotation is the very opening of David B.
Frohnmayer [long-time elected Attorney General of Oregon and
then president of the University of Oregon], Who’s To Judge?, 58
OR. SR. B. BULL. 9, 9 (1997).
48. We cannot overemphasize that the entire point of work on judicial
selection is to protect and promote the suitability of the lawyers
who will enter and stay on the bench. There will never be a short-
age of lawyers eager to be judges, but the size and caliber of the
pool changes. To go on the bench already involves a greater—and
steadily increasing—loss of income. “Judges’ Pay: A Chasm Far
Worse Than Realized, and Worsening,” the title of my 2007 arti-
cle, 82 IND. L.J. 1273, has been downloaded incomparably more
than any other product of my 26 years’ work on judicial elections
and selection. 
49. In my view, whether the worst impact of the Iowa event will be
what it does to affect who seeks judgeships, or what it does to
reduce judges’ protection of constitutional rights in unpopular
matters, is hard to predict. But which is worst doesn’t matter:
both are destructive departures from our constitutional order.
50. I must confess error in being focused on the election and failing to
think about other developments now doing severe damage to our
justice system. Iowa’s new Chief Justice Mark Cady, in his State of
the Judiciary Address in January, discussed two topics:  the recent
election and the role of courts in constitutional review, and the
Iowa courts’ recent budget cuts. On the latter, he included this:
“In addition, our work has grown in the past few years
as a direct result of cuts in services for treating abused and
neglected children and troubled youths. The following
observations of Juvenile Court Officer Paul Thompson of
Marshall County best describe this situation: 
“The front end kids are no longer being served, or if they
are, not as well. We . . . get these kids later when their prob-
lems are more firmly entrenched. . . . The schools and the
police look to us for help and we are unable to provide much
assistance due to the lack of manpower and funds. Due to
funding problems, kids sit in detention or shelter way too
long while waiting for appropriate residential treatment. . . .
[I]t seems like we are having less success when they come
back from placement. The system is certainly broken . . .
[and] the long term effects will show up years down the
road.”  (Jan. 12, 2011), at 5.
51. Text at note 9 supra. 
job.48 And though insecurity will not worry many of the
best people, they will be worse than worried by the likeli-
hood that their colleagues will be unduly concerned about
possible public reactions to high-visibility decisions.  One
chief justice said this of the Iowa election impact:  “[T]his
may be the most significant and long term damage from
the election. There is no way to gauge how many attor-
neys decide to ‘pass’ on the judicial career because of
this.”49
3. Courts will be less able to serve in the indispensable man-
ner in which they have served since we adopted our con-
stitutions—as the bodies that are as insulated from public
passions as we can make them, to review the acts by offi-
cials in other branches in order to assure protection of
individual rights and the rule of law. 50
Although I do predict that the Iowa election is likely to
mean more trouble in judicial elections, this is not predicting
more defeats.  Just as in California after the 1978 challenges to
trial judges,51 there is every reason to believe that justices,
judges, and their supporters will be more ready to meet (and
head off) challenges.  A hallmark of judicial excellence is delib-
erativeness, but that doesn’t include unresponsiveness.
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